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Abstract The question about the scientific nature of computing has been
widely debated with no universal consensus reached about its disciplinary
status. Positions vary from acknowledging computing as the science of com-
puters to defining it as a synthetic engineering discipline. In this paper we
aim at discussing the nature of computing from a methodological perspective.
We consider, in particular, the nature and role of experiments in this field,
whether they can be considered close to the traditional experimental scientific
method or, instead, they possess peculiar and unique features. We argue that
this experimental perspective should be taken into account when discussing
the status of computing. We critically survey how the experimental method
has been conceived and applied in computing, and some open issues that could
be tackled with the aid of the history of science, the philosophy of science, and
the philosophy of technology.
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1 Introduction
The debate around the nature of computing has always been a major concern
since the beginning of the discipline. This debate presents a variety of positions.
Computing1 is defined as the science of computers and related phenom-
ena [44], but also as the natural science of procedures [47], or the artificial
science of phenomena related to computers [45] [48]. Moreover, computing is
considered as the study (and not the science) of algorithms and related phe-
nomena [36], of computational processes [9], of information [31]. Alternatively,
it is characterized as a synthetic engineering discipline [6] or as a new species
of engineering [38].
Computing is considered as dealing with computers, algorithms, processes,
procedures, information, depending on the choice made by who is providing
the definition. Moreover, it can be considered a science, or a study, a corpus
of knowledge, a discipline. Other labels that may be used to refer to it are:
computing science, informatics, computer engineering, information science.
The attention to names and definitions clearly reflects a struggle for status
that has been characterizing computing since its birth. Whether computing
is considered science (even of a special kind) or engineering, it is a matter
of fact that this characterization moves around its relationship with science.
In time, the interdisciplinary nature of computing has been widely recognized
and, accordingly, it is now defined partly as scientific, partly as mathematical,
and partly as technological [56].
But “what’s in a name?” According to [6], the ‘science’ in ‘computer sci-
ence’ is a misnaming, implying that researchers in computing (also known as
computer scientists) have to accept a hierarchy in which natural scientists are
more respected than engineers. On the contrary, in [30] it is claimed the scien-
tific status of computing, given its uniqueness. And even if computing is not
a natural science in the traditional sense as physics or biology, it is natural in
the sense that it studies naturally (and also artificially) occurring information
processes [17].
Although the debate around its nature is nowadays less radical, and the
discipline is considered as a special kind of science and of engineering or, in
other words, as a discipline comprising both a scientific and an engineering
part, still its status is discussed in terms of similarities and differences with, in
the best cases, a naive definition of science or, in the worst cases, an incorrect
one.
If we consider the so-called Denning report [13], the ACM ‘official’ view on
the discipline, the investigation of a phenomenon by adopting an experimen-
1 While recognizing the relevant difference between the theoretical and practical ends of
the computing spectrum, introducing a taxonomy is beyond the scope of this work. We
use here the term ‘computing’ to refer to the relevant field in general in the same sense
of [14], although some readers may be more familiar with the terms ‘computer science’ or
‘computer science and engineering’. We find ‘computing’ a better fit for the purposes of this
work because it does not come with any reference to or hint at the stances that emphasize
the scientific or engineering nature of this field.
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tal scientific method is reduced to an oversimplified list of processes (form a
hypothesis, construct a model and make a prediction, design an experiment
and collect data, analyze the results). Even when Denning, one of the most
influential opinion makers in this debate, argues in favor of the scientific sta-
tus of computing, his vision of science boils down to “the quest to understand
what is so about the world. Through observation and experimentation, scien-
tists seek to discover recurrent phenomena. They formulate models to capture
recurrences and enable predictions, and they seek to validate or refute models
through experiments” [14]. The idea here is that, since much computing con-
forms to these ideals, it is indeed a science. Advocating the scientific character
of the discipline goes hand in hand with the shifting of the focus from com-
puters to computation and with the consideration of the latter as a domain
distinguished from and with equal status as physics, society, and biology. As
these domains are the subject of physical, social, and life sciences, respectively,
so is computation the topic of computing [14].
Within this debate on the disciplinary nature of computing our work aims
at adding some steps by investigating such question with an analysis of the
nature of its experiments, thus adding a methodological point of view to the
ongoing discourse.
The attempt to characterize computing in terms of its method calls for the
analysis of its relationship with mathematics and the role the latter discipline
has in the former. Although mathematics constitutes one of the foundations of
computing, we argue that computing has a strong empirical character and is
not just a branch of mathematics and, thus, it should not adopt only deductive
methods.
One of the arguments, which we fully embrace against the idea that “demon-
strations can take the place of experiments” [30], has been proposed in [50].
The idea that “instead of debugging a program, one should prove that it meets
its specifications, and this proof should be checked by a computer program”
[41] is an old dream of the field, reflecting its strong connections with mathe-
matical research and methods. However, formal verification cannot prove that
the behavior of a program corresponds to how the program was intended to
behave. The existing gaps between models, algorithms, computer systems and
the world are a strong argument for us to accept the empirical character of
computing.
Some of the seminal works about the methodology of computing [8] revolve
around abstraction. In [9] for example, although recognizing the indispensabil-
ity of empirical methods, the author believes that, from a methodological point
of view, the most probing question concerns the relation between mathemat-
ics and computing. So questions such as “Is there a sense in which computer
science is experimental science?” remain unanswered even if programmatically
stated.
We believe, however, that a methodological analysis in terms of experi-
ments could be beneficial. Even if the definition of the scientific experimental
method is extremely complex and far from being not controversial, there exists
a shared tradition on what an experiment is and how experimental method
4 Viola Schiaffonati, Mario Verdicchio
works that goes beyond all the controversies in the philosophy of science, which
lie out of the scope of this work.
The same does not go for what science is in general and how it works: in this
case the disagreement is far more evident and the issues about demarcation
are still very controversial (see [25] for an introductive overview to the main
positions within this debate). If we try to define a discipline as scientific only
according to the objectives science is supposed to have (exploring, describing,
predicting, and explaining phenomena), then some activities (such as astrol-
ogy) would have to be considered scientific, because they adopt these aims. In
particular, the capability to make predictions, which in many cases is consid-
ered a necessary and sufficient condition for science, does not ensure the ‘sci-
entificity’ of a discipline, according to the peculiar method descended from the
Scientific Revolution. Let us think, for example, of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic
system and its ability to make better predictions over the Copernican system
for many years [53].
As the challenge of defining the concept of science is affected by such
controveries, any attempt to investigate whether computing is a science or
not will necessarily have to deal with these problems. We do not want to run
away from a daunting enterprise, but we think that there is another path that
enables us to start a discussion without immediately stepping into a conceptual
quagmire. Instead of trying to define the disciplinary nature of computing in an
absolute way, we rather intend to compare it with more traditional disciplines,
and assume a methodological perspective by focusing such comparison on how
the experiments in computing are characterized, in search for analogies and
differences that are meant to help us shed light on the nature of this discipline.
This work is structured as follows: Section 2 is comprised of an overview
on the the scientific experimental method and its general principles; Section 3
provides a critical review of what has been said about experiments in comput-
ing, and indicates some open issues that are worth tackling; finally, Section 4
concludes by shedding some light on future steps to take in this research path.
2 Science and Experiments
We intend to fill the gap left by the debate on the disciplinary identity of
computing, which has traditionally neglected its relationship with the experi-
mental method. Let us start by discussing how the experimental method has
been shaped when modern science was born.
2.1 The Scientific Experimental Method
One of the traits that distinguishes science from other forms of investigation
of the world is the adoption of a peculiar method based on experiments and
originated during the Scientific Revolution of the XVII century. The scientific
method, of course, is not a single, well-defined list of clear cut processes, but
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it is a collection of approaches, techniques, and procedures to investigate the
world in which, at least for natural sciences, experiments play a major role.
It is common to refer to the scientific method as the experimental method to
stress the centrality of experiments intended, since the Scientific Revolution,
as sort of questions posed to nature. These questions are related to specific
situations and deal with some parameters that are measured in the course of
the experiments themselves.
Our modern conception of experiment has emerged during the Scientific
Revolution. Since then, science has become experimental, where ‘experimen-
tal’ means based on experiments, which are more than simple collections of
observations. An experiment can be seen as a controlled experience, namely as
a set of observations and actions, performed in a controlled context, to support
a given hypothesis. In general, while experiments are performed in controlled
conditions, this does not hold for observations. For example, observing a drop
of water through a microscope does not constitute an experiment. On the con-
trary, observing the same drop, after having colored it with a chemical reagent
in order to evidence some microorganisms, can be considered an experimental
procedure performed to test the behavior of the drop under some controlled
circumstances.
Two issues seem central to grasp the very idea of experiment: the possi-
bility of controlling some of the features of a phenomenon under investigation
and the purpose for which an experiment is performed. Control deals with the
idea that experiments consist in producing controlled circumstances, in which
it can be assumed that a studied relationship does not depend on changes in
non-controlled factors, either because they are constant or because the rela-
tionship under investigation has been made independent of the variations of
these uncontrolled factors. In other words, in an experiment the phenomenon
under investigation must be treated as an isolated object. This is clearly an
artificial situation: it is assumed that other factors, which are not under in-
vestigation, do not influence the studied relationship. This is the reason for
experiments being performed in the artificial conditions of laboratories, since
in the real world it is not usually possible to control every factor that can
influence the studied phenomenon [22].
There exists a long tradition (starting from Francis Bacon) that considers
an experiment as a sort of question, posed in a specific situation and dealing
with some parameters measured in the course of the experiment itself. Let us
consider for example the experiment that allowed Galileo Galilei to discover
the famous law of falling bodies, claiming that the distance traveled by a falling
body is directly proportional to the square of the time it takes to fall. In this
case the controlled parameters chosen by Galileo were the space covered by
a falling body and the time employed to cover this space, in an ideal situa-
tion of absence of air (vacuum). The question associated to this experimental
situation is the following: does a mathematical constant relation between the
values of these quantities hold? The answer given by Galileo is not only that
this constancy exists, but also that the covered space is proportional to the
square of the time employed to cover it. Therefore, this experiment achieves a
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universal result, which depends on the parameters chosen and measured in the
experiment itself. The choice of the experimental factors and the possibility to
control them, by isolating them from all the other factors that are considered
not relevant, are central for any successful experiment.
Despite these general characterizations, a precise definition of experiment
is not straightforward. Rather than a definition, a non-exhaustive list of prop-
erties can be useful to better shape this concept. Experiments make use of
precise measurements in order to quantitatively describe the phenomenon un-
der investigation; they must be repeatable at different times and in different
places to check the validity and universality of their results; they must be re-
producible by other scientists to confirm that their results are independent of
the precise details of the experiments themselves; they must be comparable in
order to compare results of different experiments; they must be described with
a precise language to give rigor and precision to experimental data; they should
use measurement instruments, when possible, to enhance human capabilities.
These very general features of experiments are in accordance with the
view of science originated at the beginning of Scientific Revolution: science
is physics, considered as a unique corpus without any further differentiation
within it. Accordingly, the philosophical and epistemological issues that arise
in experimental practice reflect this view and are devoted to general prob-
lems, such as to investigate the general reasons trusting experimental results.
Today, both the characterization of experiments and the analysis of the corre-
lated philosophical problems reflect the high specialization of science. Since the
XVII century, science has progressively become more specialized and, today,
it is almost impossible to reflect on science in its generality. Current science
is composed of a large number of specific disciplines that range from physics
to economics and psychology, that were not even considered as scientific few
decades ago. Within each one of such disciplines the general features of ex-
periments need to be concretely translated and the corresponding philosophy
of experimentation has to deal with specific experimental problems that can
largely differ across disciplines [46].
2.2 Experimental Principles
Looking at the traditional experimental method, it is possible to single out
some principles that constitute its core. They are comparison, reproducibility
and repeatability, justification and explanation, which, although not exhausting
the complexity of experimental method, represent nevertheless some defining
characteristics of experiments. They constitute the very core of the modern
conception of experiments, in which they are so deeply rooted that they are not
even referred to in an explicit way in well-developed experimental disciplines.
Developed in the context of the Modern Scientific Revolution, these principles
helped develop a view of science as a collective activity. Science has become
the activity of strongly connected scholars, widespread all over Europe, and
highly interested in exchanging their results and achievements. The ancient
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conception of a single scientist (or, better, of a philosopher of nature, as scien-
tists were called until the XIX century), capable of carrying out his/her whole
research in isolation, slowly faded off, due both to the exceptional growth of
scientific knowledge, almost impossible to be managed by a single person, and
to the acknowledgment of science as a critical activity [57]. This latter point
is central in the development of the conception of experiment considered as
more than just a collection of observations. Better achievements can be gained
if knowledge is at disposal and can be exchanged among scholars. Clearly, the
possibility to compare different results and to make reproducible insightful
experiments is at the basis of this new attitude.
Let us consider the principles in more detail.
Comparison
The meaning of ‘comparison’ is two-fold. On the one hand, it means to know
what has been already done in the past within the same field of research, both
for avoiding to repeat uninteresting experiments and for getting suggestions
on what the interesting questions could be. On the other hand, comparison
refers to the possibility for future researchers to accurately compare their new
results with the old ones. If these features are easily given for granted in
principle, serious difficulties can arise in actual comparisons. In particular, a
direct comparison may be problematic. To be comparable with others, an ex-
periment must be thoroughly documented. Moreover, comparison should be
accomplished on the basis of a ‘sincerity’ principle that often can be easily
disregarded. One should report any strange or unexpected phenomenon en-
countered during experimentation. This is not just for reasons of intellectual
honesty, but also because anomalies can reveal something important and bring
to new discoveries.
The discovery of the planet Neptune in 1846 is a well-known example of
how an anomaly can turn out to be decisive for a new discovery. According
to the Newtonian theory, astronomers were able to calculate the hypothetical
orbit of Uranus, at that time considered the most distant planet of the Solar
system. However, this hypothetical orbit was not in accordance with the orbit
actually reported in well-documented series of observations. This incongruence
was not considered sufficient to reject the whole Newtonian theory, but gave
some hints on the fact that something in the theory itself needed a revision.
Two astronomers, Adams and Le Verrier, tried to explain this anomaly by pos-
tulating the existence of a further planet not yet observed. They first assumed
the existence of a new planet (Neptune), farther than Uranus; they calculated
its mass and position; and, eventually, they observed it in a position almost
identical to the calculated one [26].
Reproducibility and Repeatability
These features are often confused but, although tightly connected, they refer
to different desiderata. They are also related to comparison and to the very
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general idea that scientific results should undergo to the most severe criticisms
in order to be strongly confirmed.
Reproducibility is the possibility to verify, in an independent way, the re-
sults of a given experiment. It refers to the fact that other experimenters,
different from the one claiming for the validity of some results, are able to
achieve the same results, by starting from the same initial conditions, using
the same type of instruments, and adopting the same experimental techniques.
As in the case of comparison, to be reproducible an experiment must be fully
documented.
Repeatability concerns the fact that a single result is not sufficient to ensure
the success of an experiment. A successful experiment must be the outcome of
a number of trials, performed at different times and in different places. These
requirements guarantee that the result has not been achieved by chance, but
is systematic. Repeatability should be intended here in a wide meaning as,
according to [29], real repeatability is never realized in practice. Typically,
repetitions of an experiment are attempts to do the same thing better, namely
to produce a more stable, less noisy version of the phenomenon created during
the experiment itself. Even when the goal is to try to make precise measure-
ments, what is called for is a better experiment, that increases the precision
of measurements so that systematic errors can be eliminated. The only cases
of literal repetitions of experiments are those in which people do not believe
experimental results, and repetition is made to overcome this skepticism.
A particularly clear example to illustrate both reproducibility and repeata-
bility is given by the controversy about the supposed discovery of the cold fu-
sion claimed in 1989 by Stanley Pons and Martin Fleischmann, two chemists at
the University of Utah and at the Southampton University, respectively [10].
In a news press, they claimed to have produced nuclear fusion in a tabletop
experiment, reporting anomalous heat production of a magnitude that (they
asserted) would defy any explanation, except in terms of nuclear processes.
They interpreted the absence of neutrons in their experiment as the proof for
a new type of nuclear reaction. The paper describing this supposedly revolu-
tionary result (rejected by Nature, but accepted for publication in the Journal
of Electroanalytical Chemistry) contained just five references; three of them
were to their precedent works, without any reference to the vast literature on
the problem in the nuclear physics field, thus revealing a complete ignorance
of the previous work. Moreover, they did not give sufficient details to repro-
duce their experiment nor adequate proofs that their results were the effects
of systematic trials. After some time, it turned out that they forgot some
basic procedures in their experimentation and that the extraordinary results
they claimed to have achieved were not repeatable. In the news press, which
unusually took place before the publication of their paper, they declared to
have worked on cold fusion in secret during the preceding five years. Also this
particular shows that their behavior was not experimentally nor scientifically
sound. Science as experimental activity cannot be conducted in isolation. In
the achievement of experimental results, other scientists’ comments and cri-
tiques have a fundamental role to revise work and to check its validity.
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Justification and Explanation
This principle deals with the drawing of well-justified conclusions on the basis
of all the information collected during an experiment. In an experimental pro-
cedure, it is not sufficient to collect as much precise data as possible, but it
is necessary to look for an explanation of these data. Therefore, not only the
drawn conclusions must be strongly supported, but also all the data from an
experiment should be interpreted in order to derive the correct implications.
Usually experiments in physics are considered ‘good’ when they are grounded
in existing theories and use an apparatus that measures the quantities of in-
terest with sufficient accuracy and precision [21]. In this case, experiments
are theory laden in that the terms and the used apparatus are dependent on
existing theory. One of the important roles of experiments in physics is to
test theories [22]: as already discussed, an experiment can confirm an existing
theory or can show that a new theory is required, either by showing that an
accepted theory is incorrect or by exhibiting a new phenomenon that calls
for an explanation. Therefore, the well-founded and comprehensive theories of
physics provide the conceptual framework in which experiments are designed
and realized. At the same time, theories are tested by experiments that, in
some cases, can show that they are inadequate or incomplete. The difficult
part concerns the fact that experiments may not always give clear-cut results:
the so called crucial experiments [18], those that quickly decide in a defini-
tive way between two or more competing theories, are exceptions. In all other
cases, experiments are much more difficult to interpret and, as a consequence,
complex to explain.
Physicists, however, have a reasonable belief in experiments and in their re-
sults: how is that possible? This question has been addressed by many philoso-
phers of science. Among those, Hacking [29] proposed an elaborated answer,
setting out a number of strategies for believing in experiments. For example,
he stresses the crucial role of intervention in the experimental practice. He
considers in particular the case of microscopes used in experiments [28]. For
instance, in looking at a cell through a microscope, one may inject some fluid
into the cell, in order to change the cell color when the operation is done. If
one actually observes the predicted effect of this intervention, his/her beliefs
in the proper operation of the experimental apparatus and in the data col-
lected with it are strengthened. Of course this cannot be the only strategy.
Independent confirmation, namely that the same data can be collected by dif-
ferent microscopes, is another strategy that may be combined with the first
one. But what happens when an experiment can be performed with only one
type of apparatus or when the intervention is very difficult, if not impossible?
In such cases other strategies for trusting experiments are possible. The ex-
perimental apparatus can reproduce known phenomena such that, in case of
success, the belief in its proper working is enhanced. Other strategies include:
the reproduction of artifacts that are known in advance, the elimination of
alternative explanations of the results, the use of the results themselves to
argue for their validity, the use of an independently well-corroborated theory
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of the phenomenon to explain the results, the use of an apparatus based on
a well-corroborated theory, the adoption of statistical arguments. Of course
it is very unlikely that these strategies can be adopted all together; usually
just some of them are at disposal. They provide good reasons for believing in
experimental results, even if they do not guarantee that the results are always
correct. In the history of science, there are many cases in which these strate-
gies have been adopted, but experimental results eventually turned out to be
incorrect. Experiments are fallible: this does not mean that it is not possible to
reach well-justified conclusions, but that these conclusions are not guaranteed
once and for all.
3 Computing and Experiments
Let us critically review what has been said about experiments in computing.
We will see that such analysis sheds light on some open methodological is-
sues in the characterization of the discipline, which we propose to tackle with
conceptual instruments provided by the history of science, the philosophy of
science, and the philosophy of technology.
3.1 Calling for Experiments in Computing
Probably one of the first and most famous concepts of computer science as an
experimental science goes back to the 1976 paper by Newell and Simon pub-
lished in the occasion of their acceptance of the Turing award [45]. “Computer
science is an empirical discipline. We would have called it an experimental
science, but like astronomy, economics, and geology, some of its unique forms
of observation and experience do not fit a narrow stereotype of the experimen-
tal method. None the less, they are experiments. Each new machine that is
built is an experiment. Actually constructing the machine poses a question to
nature; and we listen for the answer by observing the machine in operation
and analyzing it by all analytical and measurement means available. Each new
program that is built is an experiment. It poses a question to nature, and its
behavior offers clues to an answer. Neither machines nor programs are black
boxes; they are artifacts that have been designed, both hardware and software,
and we can open them up and look inside. We can relate their structure to
their behavior and draw many lessons from a single experiment. We don’t have
to build 100 copies of, say, a theorem prover, to demonstrate statistically that
it has not overcome the combinatorial explosion of search in the way hoped
for. Inspection of the program in the light of a few runs reveals the flaw and
lets us proceed to the next attempt.”
It is easy to recognize in these words some of the characterizing features
of the experimental method in traditional scientific disciplines, first of all the
idea of experiment as a question to nature. This conception of machines and
programs as experiments has been influential for many years, promoting the
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idea that the appeal to experience is fundamental in contrast with the view of
computer science as a pure mathematical and deductive discipline. However,
the rather ingenuous view on experiments, without any more specific reference
to some principles of experimentation, may have contributed to spread an
oversimplified conception of how the experimental method can be applied to
computing.
The quest for experiments in computing began to be treated systemati-
cally at the beginning of the 1980s, following a crisis in what was then called
experimental computer science. In an ACM report published in 1979 [33], ex-
perimental research in computer science is strongly related to the measurement
and testing of computing algorithms and systems. In the same issue of the jour-
nal [42] where the ACM report was published, the call for experimentation is
expressed in terms of the recognition of the possibility for major advantages
in different fields of computing. At the same time, a ‘rejuvenation’ of exper-
imental computer science is advocated from very concrete perspectives: for
example by promoting experimental facilities for computer systems research.
However, experimental computer science is seldom defined in a precise way in
this context, and experiments are conceived mainly as explorations.
Experimental computer science is to be rejuvenated also according to Peter
Denning, who proposes in a short article that the experimental work produced
in computer science should be judged by traditional standards [15]. Denning
advances the idea that to implement experimentally a computer system is not
just to build the system and “see what happens”. In a way, this approach
tries to go beyond the ‘construct and test’ paradigm of Newell and Simon, by
proposing that experimental computer science has to deal with the process
of supporting and testing a hypothesis, thus making computing closer to the
standards of rigor and the practice of traditional sciences. Unfortunately, ex-
perimental science in general is reduced to the process of classifying knowledge
derived from observations. Denning concludes with a programmatic proposal:
traditional experimental criteria should be applied in evaluating the results of
experimental computer science.
Although some efforts along this direction have been put to work over the
years [13] [52] [37], the above mentioned guidelines, whether reductive or not,
remained mostly unattended.
More recently, a trend has once again emerged toward making the experi-
mental scientific method take center stage in computing. These recent efforts
in several projects have shown a renewed need for an experimental method-
ology in this discipline [24] [43]. Experiments are deemed to have an impact
on several aspects of computing: their importance is recognized for assess-
ing computing systems’ performance and for triggering new developments [13]
[24] [43] [52], and experimentation with prototypes is considered essential in
use-inspired research and product design [49]. Moreover, the use of the exper-
imental scientific method is advocated to understand computations that are
often too complex for mathematical analysis, to prove their correctness, to
check consistency with hypotheses, to uncover performance constraints, and
to show whether original goals are met [11].
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‘Experimental computer science’ has become a quite common label to
which today (at least) three different meanings can be associated [20]. The
first one refers to the type of research devoted to the realization of concrete
systems; this kind of activity lies in the realm of engineering rather than sci-
ence, and thus its experimental side is related to the demonstration of the
feasibility of these systems, whether software or hardware. The second mean-
ing [16] views experimental computer science as the mathematical modeling
of the behavior of complex systems, where the anticipated properties of the
systems have to be tested experimentally. This ‘experimental feedback’ is rec-
ognized elsewhere as the underlying force of computing [45]. The third meaning
defines the discipline as the evaluation of computer systems by means of the
traditional methodologies of natural sciences [52], such as repeatability.
Despite the increasing interest in a more rigorous methodological approach
to computing, many lament that the current methodology is inadequate and
that, in comparison with other fields (e.g. natural sciences), computer scientists
should experiment more [12]. Indeed, several articles describe demonstrations
rather than real experiments [20], and their sections on experimental results
present just weak examples to show the superiority of the proposed solution
over a limited amount of alternatives [58] [59] [1].
The invitation to experiment more and better is not always based on con-
vincing arguments. From the one side, it is generally claimed that “without
experiments, computer science is in danger of drying up and becoming an
auxiliary discipline” [52] and that experimentation can accelerate progress,
but no precise analysis of how this experimentation should be carried out in
the various fields of computing is provided. On the other side, the adoption of
a scientific (in the sense of experimental) approach in computing is justified
by the tremendous success of scientific reasoning. Still, no serious inquiry is
carried out about the possibility and the consequences of plainly importing
traditional scientific methods into computing [43].
The call for an increase in experimentation has often been made with an
emphasis on making computing more scientific. However, this ‘scientificity’ is
taken as a positive goal per se, without any discussion on whether computing
can really benefit from being more scientific, or even on what it really means
‘to be more scientific.’
Despite this lack of strong foundations, many recommendations (see [5] [32]
[4] [54] [1] [40]) present common traits: they stem from the acknowledgment
of a crisis in computing that is meant to be overcome with a greater maturity
of the discipline, in terms of a more rigorous experimental method and a
more scientific approach to the search for solutions. The title of one of these
works is meaningful under this respect: Pushing Science into Signal Processing
[3]. Taking inspiration from experimental principles adopted in traditional
scientific disciplines has become a leitmotif in many analyses, which recognize,
for example, the benefits of replicable results [34] or the importance of negative
results [3], two of the cornerstones of experimental scientific method. Still,
many issues remain open and require, as we argue in the next section, a shift
from general statements to concrete discussions in computing to clarify the
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advantages and the limits of taking inspiration from more traditional scientific
disciplines.
3.2 Open Issues
No clear indication has been given on what experiments in computing are sup-
posed to be like: as hinted above, many recommendations seem to be problem-
atic from one side or another. Let us illustrate in more detail what we consider
the most recurring issues, namely, the lack of conceptual clarity and concrete
examples, and neglecting the engineering component of computing. We argue
that the instruments to tackle them may be provided by the history of science,
the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of technology.
Some proposals are weakened by a lack of clarity when it comes to the core
concepts of experimental methodology. This lack of conceptual clarity could
be improved by keeping trace on how these concepts have been conceived in
the history and philosophy of experimentation.
First of all, an accurate view on the scientific method itself is missing in
some of the works stressing the importance of ‘scientificity’ in computing. A
clear example can be found in [12], where the scientific method is traced back to
Francis Bacon, without any mention to Galileo Galilei, usually acknowledged
as the founding father of the scientific experimental method.
Moreover, empirical methods and experimental methods are often con-
fused. In some works (for instance in [43]) experiments are identified with
empirical methods, which are instead traditionally defined as based on the
aggregation of naturally occurring data, without the strict rules that are sup-
posed to guide experiments. Even when a distinction between empirical and
experimental is made, the notion of experiment is sometimes naively intended
and poorly related to the traditional view of empirical sciences, like in the
already quoted passage by Newell and Simon [45] (see Subsection 3.1). The
authors, by writing “Computer science is an empirical discipline. We would
have called it an experimental science, but” show to believe that ‘empirical’
and ‘experimental’ are two distinct concepts, but the discourse gets less clear
when they claim that computer science, no matter how artificial or synthetic
its subject can be, can be done through empirical enquiry as any other science,
thus implying that they identify ‘empirical’ with ‘experimental’.
Even works that are considered a milestone in the development of exper-
imental methods in software engineering like [35], while discussing in detail
how experiments should be intended in this field, present some ingenuous
and simplistic views on experimentation. Examples that hint at a conceptual
framework still at the very early stages of development, with an oversimplified
view of the complex relationship between theory, experiments and reality, are
the following: “the purpose of experimentation is to match ideas with reality”
(p.12), “a particular item of knowledge is considered valid if it has been checked
against reality. Scientific progress is founded on the study and settlement of
discrepancies between knowledge and reality.[...] Scientific investigations are
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objective studies, based on observations of or experimentation with the real
world and its measurable changes” (p.24).
There are of course cases in which experiments are defined within a more
solid conceptual framework including observation, measurement, and analysis
of results [24]; however, in computing, these processes are seldom illustrated
in terms of concrete examples similar to what natural scientists deal with in
their practice.
The acknowledgment of the relevance of scientific experimentation goes
hand in hand with the awareness of the limits of analytical methods. The so
called ‘scientific paradigm’ of computer science [19] is characterized by the
general claim that the methods of computer science are the methods of the
natural sciences, thus pairing deduction with empirical validation. However,
when mentioning experiments and scientific experimentation in computing,
several works fail to address how these can be applied in this field. “The
methods of computer science must combine deductive reasoning with scientific
experimentation” [19], but what does this mean in concrete?
As computing has different goals and aims than experimental physics or
biology, do experimental principles remain the same? Does it make sense to
‘import’ traditional experimental principles (comparison, reproducibility and
repeatability, justification and explanation) from other scientific disciplines
into computing? On the one side, the application of these principles allows for
a more rigorous approach to experiments within the field; on the other side,
these principles are valid for disciplines (such as physics and biology) that aim
at understanding and explaining natural phenomena, whereas computing is fo-
cused on the abstract concept of computation and the creation of technological
artifacts that implement such concepts.
There are of course various limits in taking inspiration from some general
experimental principles holding in scientific disciplines that have very different
goals than computing. One drawback is given by the fact that these principles
are not applicable in general, but they need to be specifically declined in every
situation in the various subfields of computing. Unfortunately few works seem
to be interested in investigating what this means from a practical point of
view.
Exceptions are represented by some works [4] [54] discussing how repro-
ducibility can be put into the practice of signal processing. In particular, [54]
distinguishes among three levels of reproducibility, namely reproducibility of
the algorithm, of the code, and of the data and concludes that algorithms are
generally well described and compared with each other, whereas implemen-
tation details and data are provided only in a very small number of cases.
Moreover, this concrete analysis of rigorously reproducing experimental re-
sults is paired with more general considerations on how the relevant research
community should be reframed to promote these issues, for example by pub-
lishing also negative results, or by promoting special sessions at conferences
and/or journals for all-experimental, no-novelty works.
Another interesting example of how experimental principles could be con-
cretely translated in computing is represented by some recent trends in au-
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tonomous mobile robotics [1]. Here, a concrete way to promote comparison can
be seen in the increased use of publicly available data sets [27] that provide a
common ground for comparing with more rigor the performances of different
systems. However, these comparisons are still just qualitative in most cases
(they often boil down to showing simply that a system is performing better
than others) and with poor attempts to explain and justify these results [2].
The proposals that are endowed with a discussion on concrete examples
show that the application of general experimental principles is not straight-
forward and immediate, and reveal that differences with traditional sciences
are not due only to the relatively young age of computing, but also to its
intrinsically different disciplinary nature, scientific and, at the same time, en-
gineering.
Neglecting the engineering component of computing is fairly common in the
current literature claiming for more and better experimentation in it (see for
example [52]). Computing is treated along the same line as more traditional
scientific disciplines, such as physics or biology, and the current approach is
to simply import experimental principles from one field to another.
We claim that the engineering component of computing should be consid-
ered when reflecting on the nature and role of experiments in computing and
that the notion of technical artifact, as conceived in the ‘analytic’ philosophy
of technology [23], could be a useful tool. According to [55], engineering is an
activity aimed at producing technology, and technology is a practice focused
on the creation of artifacts and artifact-based services. Let us consider for in-
stance the purposes of experimentation in autonomous mobile robotics [39].
Robotic systems are human-made artifacts with a technical function, which
seems to bring the discipline closer to engineering. Accordingly, experiments
in autonomous mobile robotics have the goal of demonstrating that a given
artifact is working in some way or that it is better than another. However,
the most advanced autonomous robotic systems are so complex that their
behavior is hardly predictable, even by their own designers, especially when
considering their interaction with the physical world. In this perspective, ex-
periments in autonomous mobile robotics are somehow similar to experiments
in natural sciences since, broadly speaking, both have the goal to understand
how complex systems work.
Similarly experiments in software engineering present this double nature.
They are aimed at establishing criteria that help make the best choices regard-
ing all the factors involved in the creation of software, such as the requirement
specification language, the team of programmers, the programming paradigm
and language, and so on. All the relevant activities are heavily human-centered,
and following a rigorous method to do research on this kind of practice becomes
particularly critical. In [7], for example, the performance of human subjects is
measured with chronometers and eye-tracking devices to verify which of four
competing graphic notation standards provides the best support to software
developers in the task of recognizing design patterns in the architecture of a
program. An experiment like this can be viewed as having a two-fold purpose:
an investigation on the effects of certain information visualization techniques
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on humans, and an analysis in search for the best practice in one aspect of the
complex software development process.
These examples reflect the peculiar position of computing at the inter-
section between engineering and science. There is a deep difference between
making research on naturally occurring phenomena and artificial ones and this
surely has an impact on computing, which deals with both kinds. Experiments
about artifacts in computing tell us more about the people that have done the
job, than the way the world is [51]. At the same time, these artifacts need
to be tested keeping in mind the technical function and use plan they have
been designed for. One could ask why we need to test artifacts that we have
created: this is due to a sort of unpredictability arising both at the level of
the artifact and at the level of its interaction with the physical environment
(including the persons) surrounding it.
With these considerations in mind, we hope to have made clear that calling
for experiments in computing does not equate with making computing more
similar, at least from a methodological point of view, to traditional scientific
disciplines. The debate on the nature of this discipline must widen its scope
to take into account the apparent features that computing acquires from its
aim at creating technical artifacts. The coexistence of scientific observation
and engineering pragmatism and their mutual influence call for a rethinking
that goes outside the scope of computing alone and involves questions that
have long been discussed in the context of the philosophy of science and may
be renewed in the philosophy of technology.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have added some steps to the debate on the disciplinary
status of computing by investigating such question with an analysis of the
nature of its experiments. As computing is characterized by different areas, the
experimental perspective plays a role only in those ones which are more similar
to empirical scientific disciplines, devoted to the discovery of the unknown.
Firstly, we have reiterated that the discipline of computing has a peculiar
character. Although this may seem like old news, we have shown that this pe-
culiarity emerges also from a methodological point of view. As a consequence,
a plain application of the classical experimental protocol seems not possible
and new experimental protocols are to be developed. If in the natural sciences
it is prescribed that the experimenter should be an outsider of the phenomenon
to be explained, it is not clear how a person working in computing, which is
aimed at producing computation-based artifacts, could be an outsider with
respect to a phenomenon (i.e. an artifact) that he or she has created [51].
Nevertheless, traditional experimental principles can provide some useful
inspiration for computing: the rigor they add is not a desirable property per
se, but it can help in the progress of a discipline and in the construction of its
status (even a very peculiar one as that of computing). This does not mean
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that computing must be considered a science, but that researchers should
recognize that rigorous methods are better than do-it-yourself approaches.
The importance of developing unique and specific experimental protocols in
computing (starting from science but moving beyond it) is further emphasized
when considering the position of this discipline at the intersection between
science and engineering with a particular focus on its experimental activity.
Experiments are performed to test artifacts and therefore the use function of
these artifacts play a major role in experimentation; at the same time, experi-
ments are made to understand better how these complex artifacts behave and
interact with the environment, or may increase the experimenter’s knowledge
about phenomena occurring in the environment, like in traditional scientific
disciplines, although the human factor intervenes in a significant way.
Secondly, in this paper we have presented a survey of computing and ex-
periments and we have singled out some open issues. We have argued that to
deal successfully with them, which are mainly due to a deep conceptual un-
certainty, the history of science, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy
of technology should be taken into account.
Philosophers have traditionally refrained from getting their hands dirty
with technology. Philosophers of science have developed a paradigm of science
that has been strongly influenced by their championing of physics. Things
do not seem to be much different nowadays, but some counterexamples like
the analytic philosophy of technology are on the rise. We consider it a very
promising path, because in the light of what we have said, it is rather clear
that the debate on the disciplinary nature of computing goes well beyond its
boundaries, and given its undeniable engineering component, the discussion
appears to be a topic well worth investigating in the context of the philosophy
of technology.
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